"setups" of special forces in the Chechen mountains. Attack on Argun and Shali
It was one of the first major clashes in the First Chechen War. Was it a war or a constitutional order? Of course, the war. If you look at the composition of the groups on both sides of the conflict, it becomes obvious that there were no spontaneous militia and peaceful shepherds who descended from the mountains to protect the self-named Ichkeria. Of course, there may have been some of them, but the backbone of the Dudayev army was clearly not spontaneous and militia. If there is time and mood, I will complete a post about the size and composition of forces before December 11, 1994 (the day the troops began to enter the Chechen Republic).
Start.
On December 12, 1994, a column of the combined parachute regiment of the 106th Airborne Division and the 56th Airborne Assault Brigade was fired from the BM-21 Grad MLRS. During the shelling, 6 people immediately died, another one died later on 12/29/1994 in the hospital. Burdenko, 13 people were injured of varying severity.
Surprisingly, the very next day, an article about the events of December 12, 1994 was published not just anywhere, but in the English edition of The Guardian (“Guardian”). The article is still preserved and is available at the link (https://www.theguardian.com/world/1994/dec/13/chechnya). What follows from the article. Firstly, the data was provided by the well-known Ukrainian nationalist journalist Taras Protsyuk (this is the one who died of injuries in 2003 when American tankers shelled the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad). Secondly, judging by Protsyuk's information, the BM-21 installations were located near the oil depot (a number of eyewitnesses, by the way, claimed that there was a ban on shelling this object). Thirdly, turntables appeared and worked out later. Photographer Georgy Tambulov saw how the Chechens tried to shoot down the turntables, but to no avail. Fourthly, the same photographer spoke about 2 Chechen T-72s working out from machine guns, as well as about a pair of Su-25s covering Chechen positions.
How did the battle look through the eyes of eyewitnesses.
General direction of movement (http://www.ljplus.ru/img4/b/o/botter/1994_12_12_14_20.jpg)
Column composition:
- Tank 141 separate tank battalion 19 MSD
- Consolidated paratrooper battalion 137 PDP
- Consolidated paratrooper battalion 51 PDP
- Self-propelled artillery battalion 1142 artillery regiment
- Anti-tank artillery battery 1142 artillery regiment
- Anti-aircraft missile battery of the 56th separate airborne brigade
- Combined paratrooper battalion of the 56th separate airborne brigade
The leadership of the Chechen forces was carried out by Vakha Arsanov, a former police captain who received the rank of divisional general in the CRI. At that moment, he was appointed commander of the North-Western Front of the Armed Forces of Ichkeria. On December 11, as the convoy of federal forces approached the village of Dolinsky, it was accompanied by several Arsanov fighters, who collected information about the forces of the convoy and the route of its movement. In particular, one of the militants, driving his own Zhiguli, drove through all the checkpoints under the guise of a local resident, collected the necessary information and calmly returned to Arsanov. Arsanov turns to Aslan Maskhadov to provide him with BM-21 Grad launchers and strike at a moving column. On the night of December 11-12, militant units, by order of Arsanov, occupied the dominant height near the village. Everything was ready for the ambush.
Until 12/20/1994, the Commander of the OGV in the Chechen Republic (as well as the Commander of the North Caucasian Military District) was Colonel General Alexei Nikolayevich Mityukhin. Several characteristics
Lieutenant General Lev Yakovlevich Rokhlin:
“Take, for example, the commander of the district, General Mityukhin. He is a strong leader who knew how to get his orders carried out. He did a lot to equip the district. And for the peace period he was a good commander. But at the same time he was a product of the era. no experience of leading troops in war conditions.He was easily questioned when it came to solving the direct tasks of the army.As a witness to its collapse, flight (you can’t call it otherwise) from Germany and other countries of Eastern Europe, he was not ready for decisive action. himself all the tyranny of politicians, he did not see the possibility of resisting him. He was taught to think only about how not to set himself up ... "
The head of intelligence of the Airborne Forces, Colonel Pavel Yakovlevich Popovskikh:
“The commander of the grouping of troops, Mityukhin, I call him again, did not give any instructions or orders at all at that time. The only thing he was able to say to the commanders of the units that were supposed to be brought into Chechnya tomorrow is: “there is no need to steal straw from the Chechens from the fields . I, I have some money, I'll give you a last resort, pay. "I swear it was real."
Detection of the positions of the CRI detachment.
On December 12, shortly before the strike, reconnaissance discovered Chechen BM-21 Grad installations, but the command was unable to use the intelligence. Tells Colonel Pavel Yakovlevich Popovskikh - head of intelligence of the Airborne Forces in 1990-1997.
At that time, Colonel General Mityukhin commanded the North Caucasus Military District and the United Group of Forces. The northern group under the command of the Deputy Commander of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General Alexei Alekseevich Sigutkin, approached Dolinskoye, a village on the northwestern outskirts of the Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny. Sigutkin did not lead the group along the roads, but passed along the Tersky Range, bypassing all posts and ambushes. Therefore, he was the first to approach Grozny from the north.
The column was accompanied by a pair of MI-24 helicopters, which conducted aerial reconnaissance and, if necessary, could strike with NURSs. Helicopter flights were controlled by the commander of aviation of the North Caucasus Military District, General Ivannikov, who was in Mozdok at the Central Bank of Aviation of the North Caucasus Military District. In addition to the crews, the helicopters were reconnaissance officers of the 45th Special Forces Regiment of the Airborne Forces. Radio communication with them was maintained by the head of the operational-intelligence department of the regiment, Major V.L. Yersak.
In those conditions, it was a very effective way of reconnaissance. After all, pilots are mainly engaged in controlling the helicopter and its weapons. And the scouts are aimed precisely at observing the terrain and the enemy on the ground. Naturally, they see further and understand more about ground tactics. On the outskirts of Dolinsky, it was our scouts who discovered an enemy detachment, a couple of tanks and a BM-21 Grad launcher, which were hidden behind buildings.
Pilots and scouts, each through their own channels, report to the command of the group about the enemy, including the installation of the BM-21 and tanks, indicate their location. General Aleksey Sigutkin immediately turns the column into battle formation and gives the command to helicopters to hit the identified targets. But the helicopter pilots have their own direct boss!.. The flight commander reports to General Ivannikov and asks him for permission to strike to kill. Ivannikov replies: "Wait, I'll ask the Chief." Ivannikov's chief was General Mityukhin.
Literally a minute later, Ivannikov gives the pilots Mityukhin's order forbidding strikes on identified targets, motivating this decision by the presence of an oil pipeline in that place. Sigutkin gives a command to his scouts and gunners for additional reconnaissance and suppression of targets. But the rugged terrain and distance did not allow immediately to directly see the enemy and immediately give fire weapons target designation for destruction.
At this time, helicopters, which according to the plan should change every two hours, leave for replacement. While the other pair has not yet taken their place in the battle formation, one enemy tank comes out from behind the shelter and stands on the slope of the ridge opposite from Sigutkin, showing the direction of fire to the calculation of the BM-21 Grad installation. After all, Chechen tankers from the tower see our battle formations, but the tank itself remains hidden from observation of the crest of the hill, and our observers do not see it! The calculation of the installation only needs to turn around in the direction that the tank sets with its position, and set the range to our troops on the sight. After that, the installation produces a salvo with all its forty 122 mm caliber rockets each ...
If the column had not turned into a chain in time, the losses could have been very large. Rockets from Grad always fall in a highly elongated ellipse. If such an ellipse covers the column along, then every third projectile can find a target.
From this volley there was a direct hit by a rocket projectile on the Ural car and the artillery fire control vehicle. In it was Colonel Frolov, Chief of Artillery of the 106th Airborne Division, the crew of the vehicle itself and a senior officer from the headquarters of the airborne troops, Colonel Alekseenko. Six people died at the same time. These were the very first combat losses suffered by the United Group of Forces in Chechnya.
At the CBU, the Mityukhin general's team immediately tried to blame the paratroopers of General Alexei Sigutkin for everything. He allegedly did not conduct reconnaissance, hesitated, did not control the troops ... But all reports, negotiations and commands in the radio network of helicopters were recorded on tape by Major Yersak. They clearly recorded that the installation was discovered on time and could have been destroyed on the spot at the command of General A. Sigutkin, if Mityukhin's direct order had not followed, forbidding helicopter pilots to open fire to kill. I was forced to produce these records and show the true culprit of the death of our soldiers and officers (soon Mityukhin was replaced as commander of the grouping by General Anatoly Kvashnin, the future Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces).
However, our “disappointment” with everything that happened that day was not over yet. A few hours later on the evening news NTV broadcasting company receives a report from Chechnya, made by a correspondent of this television company. There, the operator, under the voice of a commentator choking with delight, shows how this most ill-fated BM-21 Grad installation comes out of cover to a firing position, launches rockets at our grouping. The installation crew left the position, standing on the running board of the car passing by the camera lens. I still remember the excited and joyful Chechens, shot in close-up, and shouting: “Allah Akbar!”.
Approximately two weeks later, I found myself on that hillock, and from the landscape familiar from the TV show, I realized that I was in the very place where the NTV cameraman was.
By the way, three days later, scouts of the 45th regiment of the special forces of the Airborne Forces found this BM-21 Grad installation. She was hiding in a hangar, so it was impossible to detect her from the air. But we knew that it was located in the Staropromyslovsky district. And this area is one long, long street, or rather, a highway. On both sides of it are mainly production and storage facilities.
Scouts under the command of Colonel Boris Alexandrovich Kozyulin, using one old portable radio direction finder (the second one broke down, and there was no one to repair it), took the bearing to the radio station, which was used by the calculation of this installation. Then they drew it on the map and determined its location at the intersection of the bearing with the highway. There was a hangar right there. It was hit by artillery and aircraft. Everything was smashed - along with the calculation ...
From the description of the fight:
“Having stopped 8 kilometers from Dolinskoye to decide on further actions, they suddenly saw through binoculars something similar to the installation of a multiple launch rocket system. “Chechens are loading the Grad,” the crew of the turntable confirmed the fears.
At this time, the rest of the column is pulled up to the head of the column.
Senior gunner ZU zrbatr 56 ovdbr
"The column usually walked, overcoming the highlands along a wet clay road. Suddenly we heard very loud explosions, it was nearby. The command" to battle "was not long in coming, but after leaving the transport we did not see anything. There were 50 meters left to the top of the hill. And then we noticed fast-flying fires near the horizon - it was the next volley, about 4 rockets. They fell behind the hill, where the road we were driving led. Everyone rushed to the height.
The picture was gloomy. Despite the fact that the column was stretched out, 3 BMDs, 2 Urals and Gaz 66 with ZU-23 were under fire (this was the first calculation of our battery). One BMD stood torn apart, the second tried to move somewhere with a downed track, the third was on fire. The Urals showed no signs of life, while the shishiga, on the contrary, actively tried to leave the funnel. The abandoned ZU stood on wheels, there were no fighters to be seen, only someone's obese figure vigorously waved his arms. On the right, 5-7 km away, the pipes of the tank farm were visible. Especially the little things were not visible, we were still, though at a height, but far away.
Our fascinated by the spectacle and dumbfounded faces, with his cry "to battle" was awakened by the platoon leader (at that time senior lieutenant Kobzar). We immediately deployed the zushka and after 20 seconds I was sitting behind the trunks. In the ground, I could see both the fighters and this obese figure, which belonged to Lieutenant Colonel Kaverin (air defense chief of the 56th brigade). Which organized the withdrawal of equipment and personnel from under fire. There were 3 volleys in total. The one we saw was the last.
By that time, the Urals were able to rise to our height, like with Tula - it was an LNG calculation, and the Urals with a howitzer. The rest of the column was standing. The last communication UAZ jumped onto our skyscraper. Lieutenant Colonel Vartsaba was in the cockpit. Looking through binoculars at what was happening, he ordered the howitzer to deploy the gun and prepare for battle. Signalman to contact the command. It was impossible not to hear his conversation.
I don’t remember verbatim, but the meaning is as follows: From the side of the oil depot, our convoy was fired upon, may I return fire? The answer was no. He repeated the request again. This time he jumped out of the cab, throwing the phone at the signalman. He quickly approached the weapon. Follow him, the signalman shouted - Comrade Colonel, the order is not to open fire on the oil depot! In response, he said: - Shut up! I did not hear this order. Break your hurdy-gurdy. And turning to the howitzer - Load!
A direct hit was from the second shot, one of the pipes swayed and fell.
Major 1182 ap A. Yuknikov:
"On December 12, the unit in which Sasha [Mineev] served, as part of a column of several parts, made a forced march to the indicated area. The column was moving between two mountains, its head was already reaching a flat plateau. At this time, Colonel Alekseenko was on the mountain, on at a distance of about seven kilometers, noticed the tanks and gave the order to turn around in battle formation. But at that moment shelling began. No one could make out where the shells were coming from, since the distance was very large and where the shooting was being carried out was not visible. As it turned out later, the fire four "Grad" installations were fired, which fired three volleys. One of the shells hit the second car in the direction of travel ... Sasha was in the fourth car. Their car was not damaged. But during the shelling, the personnel began to leave the equipment and concentrate on terrain, since it was not safe to be in the vehicle, she was too vulnerable in the column. Apparently at that moment Sasha was wounded ... "
Departure of the head of the column
Senior gunner ZU zrbatr 56 ovdbr
“The lieutenant colonel’s correction was interrupted by the captain’s cry: “We are under attack!” I turned the barrels and looked down. Because of the smoke, it was not very visible, but it was clear that on the left, just where the survivors were pulling away, equipment was moving quite quickly from under the hill, turning into a chain. Vartsaba ordered LNG to fight, and the howitzer and me to go on direct fire. I clearly distinguished the contour of the tank, it went first and straight at us. I counted the rest of the armor for the BMP, which I immediately reported. In response, I only see ...
Fortunately, this technique turned out to be ours (more precisely, yours, Tula). The head of the column turned around and returned to the place of shelling bypassing the hill. We considered them a ground group after artillery preparation and almost opened fire. Well, someone noticed an anti-mine trawl in front of the tank, as it was on ours.
And only after 30 minutes the turntables arrived. A couple of mi 24. They flew around the oil depot, then somewhere to the forest and there they released several nurses. In general, not far from the place of shelling, we took up defensive positions, and stuck out there for a couple of days. "17
Thus, after the shelling, the federal forces took up defensive positions in the area of the village. On December 17, Dudayev attacked units of the 106th Airborne Division. The defense of the rear of the column was organized by Major Anikushkin A.V. During the battle, a BMD was hit. Anikushkin on a attached tank covered her and ensured the evacuation of the crew. With fire from a combat vehicle, he destroyed four militants and suppressed the enemy's firing point. Anikushkin himself, however, received a severe concussion and burns, but remained in service until the end. In the same area, a mine was blown up (IMR) (crew: senior lieutenant G. L. Dedkov, privates Latypov A. R., Varlamov A. A., Goncharov A. A.). Machine commander st. Lieutenant Dedkov received multiple shrapnel wounds and was evacuated by his crew to a safe place. Privates Latypov and Goncharov went to the nearest checkpoint for help, while Private Varlamov remained with the wounded officer. Seeing this, the militants tried to capture the wounded senior lieutenant. For half an hour, Private Varlamov, defending his commander, fought a firefight against seven militants, destroying two of them, until help arrived.
"For four days, the regiment fought fierce battles with rebels near Dolinskoye, repelled up to a dozen militant attacks, destroyed two tanks, one armored personnel carrier, about 60 rebels. An artillery battery under the command of Major Kulikov V. M. destroyed three Grad installations"
Several military vehicles were parked in the prison yard on the outskirts of Dolinskoye. It was from here, apparently, that the three Grad installations taxied out, having managed to snap back before they were destroyed by the battery of Major Vladimir Kulikov. A police major, the head of the prison, came out to meet him: “I am the same officer as you. There are only rapists and murderers in the cells, we have already released everyone who was imprisoned by Dudayev ... ”The convicts said something else:“ Yes, they shot at you. Who was to be believed? I had to lock all the jailers in a cell, and take one with a key with me, releasing fifteen kilometers later. How insulting it was to learn later that the head of the prison was the leader of the gang that fought near Dolinsky. At the end of December they stood near Grozny. Ahead - a city stuffed with militants, behind - no rears, no supply routes ..."
dead
As a result of the shelling died:
- Colonel Evgeny Petrovich Alekseenko (from the headquarters of the commander of the Airborne Forces)
- Beginning RVIA 106 Airborne Forces Colonel Nikolai Petrovich Frolov
- private 1182 ap Alexander Valerievich Mineev (12.12.94)
- ml. sergeant 56th brigade Sergey Mikhailovich Shcherbakov (12.12.94)
- ml. Sergeant 56th brigade Sergei Nikolaevich Kovylyaev
- private 56 odbr Pavel Vladimirovich Oborin
- sergeant 1182 ap Leonid Vladimirovich Meshchanenko (died 12/29/1994 in the Burdenko hospital)
Losses of militants
According to scattered data, the Chechens lost up to 60 militants, 2 tanks, 1 armored personnel carrier, up to 3 MLRS BM - 21
During the collection of information, LJ was used
Well, what about the village of Dolinsky? Well, the village of Dolinsky was restored and solemnly opened in July 2015, yes. https://chechnyatoday.com/content/view/285512
In the Grozny district of the Chechen Republic, after large-scale construction and restoration work, the village of Dolinsky was opened in a solemn atmosphere.
The opening ceremony of the settlement on Saturday was attended by Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov, Deputy of the State Duma of Russia Adam Delimkhanov, Head of the Administration of the Head and Government of the Chechen Republic Magomed Daudov and other officials.
After the official opening ceremony of the reconstructed village, 300 local children received gifts from the Regional Public Foundation named after the Hero of Russia Akhmat-Khadzhi Kadyrov: boys - bicycles, and girls - dolls. The head of the Chechen Republic cycled through the village and got acquainted with the work done.
It should be noted that 47 multi-apartment residential buildings have been restored in the village, in which 560 apartments have been repaired. A mosque for 200 seats, a sports hall and an administrative building were built. A major overhaul of a school, a medical outpatient clinic, a kindergarten for 120 children and the building of the housing and communal services department was carried out. About 6 kilometers of intra-settlement roads have been repaired, which are covered with asphalt and surrounded by curbs. Engineering networks - sewerage and gas, light and water supply systems have been completely updated. The reconstruction was carried out at the expense of the funds of the Akhmat-Khadzhi Kadyrov ROF.
The urban-type settlement Dolinsky was founded in 1972 for the workers of the Grozny Gas Processing Plant (GPP). In 1989, after the earthquake, many houses were in disrepair. Since then, no major repairs have been carried out in the village. In 1994, during the hostilities, the GPP was destroyed, and housing facilities, road facilities, engineering networks, administrative and social buildings of the village were also damaged. Currently, about one and a half thousand people live in Dolinskoye.
It was one of the first major clashes in . Was it a war or a constitutional order?
Of course, the war. If you look at the composition of the groups on both sides of the conflict, it becomes obvious that there were no spontaneous militia and peaceful shepherds who descended from the mountains to protect the self-named Ichkeria. Of course, there may have been some of them, but the backbone of the Dudayev army was clearly not spontaneous and militia.
Start
On December 12, 1994, a column of the combined parachute regiment of the 106th Airborne Division and the 56th Airborne Assault Brigade was fired from the BM-21 Grad MLRS. During the shelling, 6 people immediately died, another one died later on 12/29/1994 in the hospital. Burdenko, 13 people were injured of varying severity.
Surprisingly, the very next day, an article about the events of December 12, 1994 was published not just anywhere, but in the English edition of The Guardian (“Guardian”). The article is still preserved and available at . What follows from the article:
Firstly, the data was provided by the well-known Ukrainian nationalist journalist Taras Protsyuk (this is the one who died of injuries in 2003 when American tankers shelled the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad).
Secondly, judging by Protsyuk's information, the BM-21 installations were located near the oil depot (a number of eyewitnesses, by the way, claimed that there was a ban on shelling this object).
Thirdly, turntables appeared and worked out later. Photographer Georgy Tambulov saw how the Chechens tried to shoot down the turntables, but to no avail.
Fourthly, the same photographer spoke about 2 Chechen T-72s working out from machine guns, as well as about a pair of Su-25s covering Chechen positions.
What did the battle look like through the eyes of eyewitnesses?
Column composition:
Tank 141 separate tank battalion 19 MSD
Consolidated paratrooper battalion 137 PDP
Consolidated paratrooper battalion 51 PDP
Self-propelled artillery battalion 1142 artillery regiment
Anti-tank artillery battery 1142 artillery regiment
Anti-aircraft missile battery of the 56th separate airborne brigade
Combined paratrooper battalion of the 56th separate airborne brigade
The leadership of the Chechen forces was carried out by a former police captain, who received the rank of divisional general in the CRI. At that moment, he was appointed commander of the North-Western Front of the Armed Forces of Ichkeria.
On December 11, as the convoy of federal forces approached the village of Dolinsky, it was accompanied by several Arsanov fighters, who collected information about the forces of the convoy and the route of its movement.
In particular, one of the militants in his own Zhiguli drove through all the checkpoints under the guise of a local resident, collected the necessary information and calmly returned to Arsanov. Arsanov appeals to him to allocate BM-21 "Grad" installations to him and strike at a moving column. On the night of December 11-12, militant units, by order of Arsanov, occupied the dominant height near the village. Everything was ready for the ambush.
Until 12/20/1994, the commander of the OGV in the Chechen Republic (as well as the Commander of the North Caucasian Military District) was Colonel-General Alexei Nikolaevich Mityukhin.
A few characteristics about Mityukhin:
Lieutenant General Lev Yakovlevich Rokhlin:
“Take, for example, the commander of the district, General Mityukhin. This is a strong leader who knew how to achieve the fulfillment of his orders. He did a lot to improve the area. And for a peaceful period he was a good commander. But at the same time, he was a product of the era. He had no experience in leading troops in a war. He was easily questioned when it came to solving the direct problems of the army. As a witness to its collapse, flight (you can’t call it otherwise) from Germany and other countries of Eastern Europe, he was not ready for decisive action. Having experienced all the tyranny of politicians, he did not see the opportunity to resist him. He was taught to think only about how not to be substituted ... "
The head of intelligence of the Airborne Forces, Colonel Pavel Yakovlevich Popovskikh:
“The commander of the grouping of troops, Mityukhin, I call him again, did not give any instructions or orders at all at that time. The only thing he was able to say to the commanders of the units that were supposed to be brought into Chechnya tomorrow was: “There is no need to steal straw from the Chechens from the fields. I, I have some money, I will give you as a last resort, pay. I swear it was real."
Detection of the positions of the CRI detachment
On December 12, shortly before the strike, reconnaissance discovered Chechen BM-21 Grad installations, but the command was unable to use the intelligence.
Colonel Pavel Yakovlevich Popovskikh - head of intelligence of the Airborne Forces in 1990-1997:
At that time, Colonel General Mityukhin commanded the North Caucasus Military District and the United Group of Forces. The northern group under the command of the Deputy Commander of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General Alexei Alekseevich Sigutkin, approached Dolinskoye, a village on the northwestern outskirts of the Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny. Sigutkin did not lead the group along the roads, but passed along the Tersky Range, bypassing all posts and ambushes. Therefore, he was the first to approach Grozny from the north.
The column was accompanied by a pair of MI-24 helicopters, which conducted aerial reconnaissance and, if necessary, could strike with NURSs. Helicopter flights were controlled by the commander of aviation of the North Caucasus Military District, General Ivannikov, who was in Mozdok at the Central Bank of Aviation of the North Caucasus Military District. In addition to the crews, the helicopters were reconnaissance officers of the 45th Special Forces Regiment of the Airborne Forces. Radio communication with them was maintained by the head of the operational-intelligence department of the regiment, Major V.L. Yersak.
In those conditions, it was a very effective way of reconnaissance. After all, pilots are mainly engaged in controlling the helicopter and its weapons. And the scouts are aimed precisely at observing the terrain and the enemy on the ground. Naturally, they see further and understand more about ground tactics. On the outskirts of Dolinskoye, it was our scouts who discovered an enemy detachment, a couple of tanks and a BM-21 Grad launcher, which were hidden behind buildings.
Pilots and scouts, each through their own channels, report to the command of the group about the enemy, including the installation of the BM-21 and tanks, indicate their location. General Aleksey Sigutkin immediately turns the column into battle formation and gives the command to helicopters to hit the identified targets. But the helicopter pilots have their own direct boss!.. The flight commander reports to General Ivannikov and asks him for permission to strike to kill. Ivannikov replies: "Wait, I'll ask the Chief." Ivannikov's chief was General Mityukhin.
Literally a minute later, Ivannikov gives the pilots Mityukhin's order forbidding strikes on identified targets, motivating this decision by the presence of an oil pipeline in that place. Sigutkin gives a command to his scouts and gunners for additional reconnaissance and suppression of targets. But the rugged terrain and distance did not allow immediately to directly see the enemy and immediately give fire weapons target designation for destruction.
At this time, helicopters, which according to the plan should change every two hours, leave for replacement. While the other pair has not yet taken their place in the battle formation, one enemy tank comes out from behind the shelter and stands on the slope of the ridge opposite from Sigutkin, showing the direction of fire to the calculation of the BM-21 Grad installation. After all, Chechen tankers from the tower see our battle formations, but the tank itself remains hidden from observation of the crest of the hill, and our observers do not see it! The calculation of the installation only needs to turn around in the direction that the tank sets with its position, and set the range to our troops on the sight. After that, the installation produces a salvo with all its forty 122 mm caliber rockets each ...
If the column had not turned into a chain in time, the losses could have been very large. Rockets from Grad always fall in a highly elongated ellipse. If such an ellipse covers the column along, then every third projectile can find a target.
From this volley there was a direct hit by a rocket projectile on the Ural car and the artillery fire control vehicle. It contained Colonel Frolov, chief of artillery of the 106th Airborne Division, the crew of the vehicle itself, and a senior officer from the headquarters of the Airborne Forces, Colonel Alekseenko. Six people died at the same time. These were the very first combat losses suffered by the United Group of Forces in Chechnya.
At the CBU, the Mityukhin general's team immediately tried to blame the paratroopers of General Alexei Sigutkin for everything. He allegedly did not conduct reconnaissance, hesitated, did not control the troops ... But all reports, negotiations and commands in the radio network of helicopters were recorded on tape by Major Yersak.
They clearly recorded that the installation was discovered on time and could have been destroyed on the spot at the command of General A. Sigutkin, if Mityukhin's direct order had not followed, forbidding helicopter pilots to open fire to kill. I was forced to produce these records and show the true culprit of the death of our soldiers and officers (soon Mityukhin was replaced as commander of the grouping by General Anatoly Kvashnin, the future Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces).
However, our “disappointment” with everything that happened that day was not over yet. A few hours later, the evening news of the NTV television company broadcasts a report from Chechnya, made by a correspondent of this television company. There, the operator, under the voice of a commentator choking with delight, shows how this most ill-fated BM-21 Grad installation comes out of cover to a firing position, launches rockets at our grouping. The installation crew left the position, standing on the running board of the car passing by the camera lens. I still remember the excited and joyful Chechens, shot in close-up, and shouting: “Allah Akbar!”.
Approximately two weeks later, I found myself on that hillock, and from the landscape familiar from the TV show, I realized that I was in the very place where the NTV cameraman was.
By the way, three days later, scouts of the 45th regiment of the special forces of the Airborne Forces found this BM-21 Grad installation. She was hiding in a hangar, so it was impossible to detect her from the air. But we knew that it was located in the Staropromyslovsky district. And this area is one long, long street, or rather, a highway. On both sides of it are mainly production and storage facilities.
Scouts under the command of Colonel Boris Alexandrovich Kozyulin, using one old portable radio direction finder (the second one broke down, and there was no one to repair it), took the bearing to the radio station, which was used by the calculation of this installation. Then they drew it on the map and determined its location at the intersection of the bearing with the highway. There was a hangar right there. It was hit by artillery and aircraft. Everything was smashed - along with the calculation ...
From the description of the battle: “Having stopped 8 kilometers from Dolinsky to decide on further actions, we suddenly saw through binoculars something similar to the installation of a multiple launch rocket system. “Chechens are charging Grad,” the crew of the “turntable” confirmed the fears.
“The column usually walked, overcoming the highlands along a wet clay road. Suddenly we heard very loud bursts, it was nearby. The command "to fight" was not long in coming, but after leaving the transport we did not see anything. There were about 50 meters left to the top of the hill. And then we noticed fast-flying lights near the horizon - this was the next salvo, from about 4 rockets. They fell behind the hill, and the road along which we were driving led there. Everyone rushed to the top.
The picture was gloomy. Despite the fact that the column was stretched out, 3 BMDs, 2 Urals and a GAZ-66 with a ZU-23 were under fire (this was the first calculation of our battery). One BMD stood torn apart, the second tried to move somewhere with a downed track, the third was on fire. The Urals showed no signs of life, while the shishiga, on the contrary, actively tried to leave the funnel. The abandoned ZU stood on wheels, there were no fighters to be seen, only someone's obese figure vigorously waved his arms. On the right, 5-7 km away, the pipes of the tank farm were visible. Especially the little things were not visible, we were still, though at a height, but far away.
Our fascinated by the spectacle and dumbfounded faces, with his cry “to battle” was awakened by the platoon leader (at that time senior lieutenant Kobzar). We immediately deployed the zushka and after 20 seconds I was sitting behind the trunks. In the ground, I could see both the fighters and this obese figure, which belonged to Lieutenant Colonel Kaverin (head of air defense of the 56th Br). Which organized the withdrawal of equipment and personnel from under fire. There were only three shots. The one we saw was the last.
By that time, the Urals were able to rise to our height, like with Tula - it was an LNG crew, and the Urals with a howitzer. The rest of the column was standing. The last communication UAZ jumped onto our skyscraper. Lieutenant Colonel Vartsaba was in the cockpit. Looking through binoculars at what was happening, he ordered the howitzer to deploy the gun and prepare for battle. Signalman to contact the command. It was impossible not to hear his conversation.
I don’t remember verbatim, but the meaning is as follows: From the side of the oil depot, our convoy was fired upon, may I return fire? The answer was no. He repeated the request again. This time he jumped out of the cab, throwing the phone at the signalman. He quickly approached the weapon. Follow him, shouted the signalman - Comrade Colonel, order not to open fire on the oil depot! In response, he said, "Shut up!" I did not hear this order. Break your hurdy-gurdy. And turning to the howitzer - Load! A direct hit was from the second shot, one of the pipes swayed and fell.
Major 1182 ap A. Yuknikov:
“On December 12, the unit in which Sasha Mineev served, as part of a column of several units, made a forced march to the indicated area. The column was moving between two mountains, its head was already reaching a flat plateau. At this time, Colonel Alekseenko, on the mountain, at a distance of about seven kilometers, noticed the tanks and gave the order to turn around in battle formation. But at that moment the shelling began. No one could make out where the shells were coming from, since the distance was very large and it was not visible from where the shooting was being carried out.
As it turned out later, the fire was fired by four Grad installations, which fired three volleys. One of the shells hit the second car in the direction of travel ... Sasha was in the fourth car. Their car was not damaged. But during the shelling, the personnel began to leave the equipment and disperse on the ground, since it was not safe to be in the equipment, it was too vulnerable in the column. Apparently at that moment Sasha was wounded ... "
Senior gunner ZU zrbatr 56 ovdbr:
“The lieutenant colonel’s correction was interrupted by the cry of the captain: “We are being attacked! I turned the trunks and looked down. Because of the smoke, it was not very visible, but it was clear that on the left, just where the survivors were pulling away, equipment was moving quite quickly from under the hill, turning into a chain. Vartsaba ordered the SPG to fight, and the howitzer and me to go on direct fire. I clearly distinguished the contour of the tank, it was the first and straight at us. I counted the rest of the armor for the BMP, which I immediately reported. The only answer I see...
Fortunately, this technique turned out to be ours (more precisely, yours, Tula). The head of the column turned around and returned to the place of shelling bypassing the hill. We considered them a ground group after artillery preparation and almost opened fire. Well, someone noticed an anti-mine trawl in front of the tank, as it was on ours.
And only after 30 minutes the turntables arrived. Pair of MI-24s. They flew around the oil depot, then somewhere to the forest and released several nurses there. In general, not far from the place of shelling, we took up defensive positions, and stuck out there for a couple of days.
Thus, after the shelling, the federal forces took up defensive positions in the area of the village. On December 17, Dudayev attacked units of the 106th Airborne Division. The defense of the rear of the column was organized by Major Anikushkin A.V. During the battle, a BMD was hit. Anikushkin on a attached tank covered her and ensured the evacuation of the crew. With fire from a combat vehicle, he destroyed four militants and suppressed the enemy's firing point.
Anikushkin himself, however, received a severe concussion and burns, but remained in service until the end. In the same area, a mine was blown up (IMR) (crew: senior lieutenant G. L. Dedkov, privates Latypov A. R., Varlamov A. A., Goncharov A. A.).
Machine commander st. Lieutenant Dedkov received multiple shrapnel wounds and was evacuated by his crew to a safe place.
Privates Latypov and Goncharov went to the nearest checkpoint for help, while Private Varlamov remained with the wounded officer. Seeing this, the militants tried to capture the wounded senior lieutenant. For half an hour, Private Varlamov, defending his commander, fought a firefight against seven militants, destroying two of them, until help arrived.
“For four days, the 51st GvPDP fought fierce battles with the rebels near Dolinskoye, repelled up to a dozen attacks by militants, destroyed two tanks, one armored personnel carrier, and about 60 rebels. An artillery battery under the command of Major Kulikov V.M. destroyed three Grad installations.
Several military vehicles were parked in the prison yard on the outskirts of Dolinskoye. It was from here, apparently, that the three Grad installations taxied out, having managed to snap back before they were destroyed by the battery of Major Vladimir Kulikov. A police major, the head of the prison, came out to meet him: “I am an officer just like you. There are only rapists and murderers in the cells, we have already released everyone who was imprisoned ... ”
The convicts said something else: “Yes, they shot at you.” Who was to be believed? I had to lock all the jailers in a cell, and take one with a key with me, releasing fifteen kilometers later. How insulting it was to learn later that the head of the prison was the leader of the gang that fought near Dolinsky. At the end of December they stood near Grozny. Ahead - a city stuffed with militants, behind - no rears, no supply routes ... "
Dead:
Colonel Evgeny Petrovich Alekseenko (from the headquarters of the commander of the Airborne Forces)
Beginning RVIA 106 Airborne Forces Colonel Nikolai Petrovich Frolov
private 1182 ap Alexander Valerievich Mineev (12.12.94)
ml. sergeant 56th brigade Sergey Mikhailovich Shcherbakov (12.12.94)
ml. Sergeant 56th brigade Sergei Nikolaevich Kovylyaev
private 56 odbr Pavel Vladimirovich Oborin
sergeant 1182 ap Leonid Vladimirovich Meshchanenko (died 12/29/1994 in the Burdenko hospital)
According to the head of intelligence of the Airborne Forces, Colonel P.Ya. Popovskikh, 12 people were wounded.
Losses of Chechen fighters
According to scattered data, the Chechens lost up to 60 militants, 2 tanks, 1 armored personnel carrier, up to 3 MLRS BM - 21
Well, what about the village of Dolinsky? Well, the village of Dolinsky was restored and solemnly opened in July 2015: In the Grozny district of the Chechen Republic, after large-scale construction and restoration work, the village of Dolinsky was opened in a solemn atmosphere.
The opening ceremony of the settlement on Saturday was attended by Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov, Deputy of the State Duma of Russia Adam Delimkhanov, Head of the Administration of the Head and Government of the Chechen Republic Magomed Daudov and other officials.
After the official opening ceremony of the reconstructed village, 300 local children received gifts from the Regional Public Foundation named after the Hero of Russia: boys - bicycles, and girls - dolls. The head of the Chechen Republic cycled through the village and got acquainted with the work done.
It should be noted that 47 multi-apartment residential buildings have been restored in the village, in which 560 apartments have been repaired. A mosque for 200 seats, a sports hall and an administrative building were built. A major overhaul of a school, a medical outpatient clinic, a kindergarten for 120 children and the building of the housing and communal services department was carried out. About 6 kilometers of intra-settlement roads have been repaired, which are covered with asphalt and surrounded by curbs. Engineering networks - sewerage and gas, light and water supply systems have been completely updated. The reconstruction was carried out at the expense of the Akhmat-Khadzhi Kadyrov Foundation.
The urban-type settlement Dolinsky was founded in 1972 for the workers of the Grozny Gas Processing Plant (GPP). In 1989, after the earthquake, many houses were in disrepair. Since then, no major repairs have been carried out in the village. In 1994, during the hostilities, the GPP was destroyed, and housing facilities, road facilities, engineering networks, administrative and social buildings of the village were also damaged. Currently, about one and a half thousand people live in Dolinskoye.
On the evening of March 28, 2000, the temporary Vedensky District Department of Internal Affairs, staffed by police officers from the Perm Region, with the Perm consolidated OMON attached to it, received an order from the commander of the Eastern Group of Federal Forces, Major General S. A. Makarov, to clean up the village of Tsentaroy in the neighboring Nozhai-Yurtovsky district.
Early in the morning of March 29, a convoy of 50 people (42 riot police from Perm and Berezniki, 8 military personnel of the commandant's company of military unit 83590 of the Taman division) moved from Vedeno to their destination to conduct a special operation to check the passport regime and carry out other activities. The column consisted of three vehicles: BTR-70 (driver Gennady Obraztsov, commandant's company, was captured, executed), the Ural-4320 car (driver Vyacheslav Morozov, the Sverdlovsk District Internal Affairs Directorate, died in battle) and the ZiL-131 car "(driver Yuri Shishkin, the only surviving fighter of the commandant's company). Before reaching a few hundred meters to the village of Zhani-Vedeno, at a height of 813, ZIL began to boil and the column was forced to stop.
Shortly before that, a detachment of militants under the command of Abu-Kuteib entered the same village. In the gang, in addition to Chechens, there were also people from the republics of the North Caucasus and foreign mercenaries (Arabs). The bandits settled in holiday homes. The commander of the riot police, Major Simonov, decided to inspect the last house. Going inside, he found two armed militants there. In response to Simonov's order to drop his weapon, shots were fired, Major Simonov was killed. At the same time, shelling of the column from small arms and grenade launchers began.
Burnt Ural
RPG shots knocked out an armored personnel carrier (a cumulative projectile hit the engine compartment) and both vehicles. The gunner (presumably the gunner's place was taken by one of the policemen, who later died from burns on the battlefield) of the burning armored personnel carrier turned the tower and opened fire on the hill, allowing the riot police to take more convenient positions for defense. The riot police and the military commandant's company took the fight, fought back to the last bullet. As the bandits approached from different parts of the village, the fire on the column intensified. In the last radio message of the policemen there was a request to shoot single shots. In all likelihood, they were running out of ammunition.
Padded armored personnel carrier
At about 10:00 am, a detachment of servicemen from the commandant's company (contract soldiers) and Perm policemen was sent from Vedeno to help the ambushed riot police. The second column, headed by the commandant of Vedeno, Colonel V. Tonkoshkurov, the head of the Vedenskiy VOVD, Colonel Yu. Ganzhin, his deputy, the former riot policeman, Lieutenant Colonel K. Strict, the commander of the Perm OMON, Lieutenant Colonel S. Gaba, tried to break through to the surrounded policemen, but not reaching them several hundred meters, she herself was ambushed. Almost immediately, the head armored personnel carrier of the commandant's company (driver Roman Muranov, shooter Dmitry Zyablikov) was hit. Fearing being trapped in a trap, the command gave the order to retreat. After about 6 hours, the column returned to Vedeno. The losses of the second column were: the commandant's company - 15 people wounded, the consolidated detachment of the Perm OMON - one wounded.
Due to the fact that part of the militants was diverted to the second column, six people from the first column were able to escape from the encirclement. On March 30, a group of six people - five riot policemen and a fighter from the commandant's company - went out to their own.
Only on March 31, federal troops (according to some reports, a battalion of the 66th regiment of internal troops and three battalions of the 104th guards airborne regiment of the 76th guards airborne division of the Airborne Forces) were finally able to reach height 813 and take out the bodies of the dead policemen and soldiers of the commandant's company. The bodies of 31 dead and one riot policeman Alexander Prokopov, seriously wounded in both legs, were found (subsequently, Alexander's leg was amputated, but he remained in the riot police). The fate of the remaining fighters by that time remained unknown. Later it turned out that twelve people (seven Berezniki riot police, four seconded employees of the Perm police and a fighter of the commandant's company) were taken prisoner and executed the next day in response to a refusal to exchange them for Colonel Yu. D. Budanov, who was arrested for the murder of a Chechen woman. The burial of 10 fighters was discovered on April 30 (according to other sources - May 1) near the village of Dargo, and information about the burial place of 2 OMON fighters had to be bought from local residents. Almost on sun
Their bodies bore traces of abuse and torture. As it turned out later, the policemen were not captured immediately. In a small group, they tried to get out of the encirclement, constantly firing back, but they could only reach a small river, which they did not have time to cross. Here they apparently ran out of ammunition. A large number of shell casings and an unexploded grenade were found around. One riot policeman was hit by machine gun fire at the bridge across the river and finished off with blows from the butt. The rest were executed not far from this place.
In the following days, this area was combed and cleared of mines by internal troops, paratroopers and police officers.
On April 19, 2000, a large-scale special operation began in the Vedeno district to eliminate Basayev and Khattab's formations concentrated here. Russian artillery attacked enemy targets in the areas of the villages of Zone, Shalazhi, Grushevoye, Tsa-Vedeno. About 500 servicemen and military equipment were deployed additionally to participate in the operation. Su-25 attack aircraft made 22 sorties, Su-24M bombers - 4. Mi-24 fire support helicopters flew into the air more than 50 times.
Losses
36 Perm militiamen and 7 servicemen of the commandant's company were killed in battle, as well as captured and executed. The number of wounded - 2 and 15, respectively.
The losses of the militants are unknown. Several corpses of foreign mercenaries were removed from the battlefield and buried near the then location of the commandant's company (Shamil Basayev's mansion, later the house was destroyed by sappers of the federal forces) with the aim of subsequent exchange for the bodies of the missing policemen. The exchange did not take place.
On March 31, Minister of the Interior of the Russian Federation Vladimir Rushailo and First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, Colonel General Yuri Baluyevsky, conducted an internal investigation. In February 2001, the materials were transferred to the main department of the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus.
During the judicial investigation, it was found that there was no special ambush on the column. This was confirmed by the testimonies of the militants who participated in that battle (they were tried in Makhachkala in the spring and summer of 2001) and the map of the battlefield (sometimes the militants had to shoot up the slope, which would most likely have been excluded if a position had been chosen in advance). Also in favor of the absence of an ambush is the fact that the shelling of the column intensified over time, as groups of militants approached from other houses in the village. But a fatal combination of circumstances - a car breakdown, the discovery of a group of militants in a house on the outskirts of the village - led to tragic consequences. Perhaps, after a rest, the militants would have gone unnoticed into the mountains. Or perhaps their goal was an attack on the "heart of Ichkeria" - Vedeno. In this case, Perm militiamen and fighters of the commandant's company, by their death, prevented an attack on the regional center and destroyed all the plans of the militants.
There were six people in the dock, none of whom pleaded guilty. Four received 14, 16, 19 and 21 years of strict regime, and two were subsequently released (first they were sentenced to 2, 5 and 3 years in prison, and then amnestied).
Ratings and opinions
Attacks on checkpoints have become more frequent. Due to inconsistency and lack of necessary skills, he was ambushed and suffered losses by a detachment (40 people) from the Perm OMON. The column made a march without reconnaissance of the route and the organization of interaction with units of internal troops and artillery. Management was carried out through open channels of communication. These omissions led to disaster. And such examples, unfortunately, were not isolated.
The events in northeastern Chechnya in January 2000 remained not very well known to the general public. Journalists constantly reported on more and more ambushes, shelling and raids, which made people in Russia simply blur their eyes. In addition, all these skirmishes were soon overshadowed by the battle for Grozny, in which the Russians took revenge for the tragic assault of 1995. Meanwhile, the battles for Argun and Shali against the detachments under the general leadership of Khattab were a fierce battle, which cost the Russian military dearly, but also dearly cost the terrorists and ended in a painful defeat for the militants.
The second Chechen war began extremely badly for the militants. Unlike the first campaign, this time the Russian troops did not rely on the psychological effect of armored columns, but suppressed resistance with a hail of heavy weapons. The capital of the republic, Grozny, was covered from the east, west and north. The bulk of the terrorist detachments retreated to the city. Russian troops were also drawn there.
However, quite a few gangs remained outside of Grozny, including large, well-trained and armed ones. The largest force outside Grozny at that time was Khattab's detachment. This Saudi was a professional Mujahideen, before Chechnya he had already fought in Afghanistan, in Tajikistan. The "cadets" of Khattab were seriously superior to ordinary militants in terms of the quality of training and weapons. In addition, many groups remained outside of Grozny, including, for example, a strong detachment of well-known slave traders, the Akhmadov brothers.
Jordan-born Chechen rebel commander Omar Ibn al-Khattab poses for photographers in Grozny, the capital of the Chechen Republic, September 13, 1999. Collage © L!FE Photo: © AP Photo
The militants' plan was pretty obvious. As the Russians surrounded Grozny with barriers, they turned their backs on the densely forested mountainous Chechnya. Numerous rear columns of the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs walked along the roads. Drivers, signalmen, cooks, repairmen most often had weak combat skills. The commandant's offices were just getting used to the recently occupied towns and villages and had little control over them.
A simultaneous strike by several hundred militants on a pliable rear could force the Russians to at least temporarily abandon Grozny and set off to "catch horses' trampling" in the villages, from where the militants would have already left. In terms of sabotage attacks, the militants were specialists and could inflict catastrophic losses on the rear. Argun, east of Grozny, and Shali, southeast of the capital, were chosen as the site of the main attack. These are large enough settlements so that their capture could not be ignored, besides, they were not too far from the mountains that save the "spirits": if necessary, one could quickly retreat from there.
The militants began preparations for their counteroffensive in early January. As usual, civilians were used for preliminary reconnaissance. Subsequently, the military often recalled the attempts of some scandalous women to enter the checkpoints; about the watchmen who "guarded" the empty huts - by an amazing coincidence, they stood on the hills with a good view; peaceful collective farmers wandering around the neighborhood, who, during the search, found walkie-talkies.
Detachments of militants began to descend from the mountains to Argun, Mesker-Yurt and Shali on January 5, but they moved slowly: for the sake of disguise, marches were made at night. Just then heavy snowfalls began, so that the columns could go unnoticed for a longer time. However, due to the same snowfalls, Ramzan Akhmadov's detachment did not go where they were going. Lost in the dark, the militants went to the area of the village of Germenchuk to the pipe repair plant. This is a large industrial area, spread over a large area and abandoned in wartime, separated from the outside world by concrete fences, so the militants came up with the idea to wait out the daylight hours inside.
By an unfortunate coincidence, just at that time, a combined criminal investigation team, OMON and SOBR with three army infantry fighting vehicles left Shali to the pipe station. The day before, Shali reported that hostages and a small detachment of terrorists were supposedly at the pipe station. There were no hostages in the industrial zone, but there were plenty of terrorists.
Chechnya, 2000. Collage © L!FE Photo: © RIA Novosti / Vladimir Vyatkin
When policemen and soldiers began combing the plant, one BMP detached itself and went forward along the factory buildings. As soon as she got deep enough into the labyrinth of buildings, they began to shoot at her from grenade launchers. After a short battle, three soldiers died, three more were captured - only one of the captives survived and was released.
OMON and SOBR officers could not help their comrades: they themselves came under fire and were now desperately firing back. Fortunately for the militiamen, there was a ditch nearby, along which the advance group was able to retreat on their own and drag the wounded. Walking crouched down to the waist in icy slush is not the most pleasant experience, but at least this makeshift trench saved the life of the soldiers. On the way, the retreating stumbled upon a local woman with children hiding among the remains of concrete structures. This family, by sheer chance, found itself between a rock and a hard place and now could only pray for salvation and ask in vain when it would be possible to get out.
There were too few policemen to resist the militants, but help from Argun came to the ill-fated pipe station. The battle continued until the evening. The next day, the industrial zone was fired from tanks and combed, but the militants were no longer there. But the Christmas battle with heavy losses was only an overture to the main battle.
On cold roads
A false start in the industrial zone did not lead to the failure of the militants from their original plans. On January 9, the main attack began - on Argun. Terrorists penetrated the city gradually, often under the guise of civilians. The task was simplified by the almost complete absence of night vision devices from the military. Bursting into the city, Khattab's people blocked roadblocks, bridges, police departments, and the railway station. The department of internal affairs and positions on the railway tried with all their might to capture. The militants tried to kill several birds with one stone at once. If successful, they would capture the garrisons, weapons and prisoners. However, even the very fact of the attack led to the fact that detachments immediately rushed to the aid of the besieged, which could be caught in ambushes on the roads. This technique was used many times in the first war, and Khattab reasonably believed that he would be able to repeat the old trick.
The militants failed to destroy at least one checkpoint, although some objects were stormed furiously, firing at the windows even with anti-tank missiles. Agitators shouted calls to surrender with megaphones, truce deputies were sent to the besieged with a proposal to surrender - these calls, of course, were refused. The commander of the stronghold on the railway even had to restrain his subordinates, who were trying to shoot the agitator without any fuss: not so much out of respect for the white flag, but because it could be a civilian who was forced to read out the demands.
Soldier of the Russian army. Photo: © AP Photo/Misha Japaridze
Although the exchange of fire was in full swing, the losses of the besieged in the police department and at the station were low. The militants tried to use the classic tactic: aimlessly shoot with heart-rending cries, in the expectation that the soldiers would lose their nerve and they would quickly shoot all the ammunition, after which the fortifications could be taken with their bare hands. However, this plan did not work, and in the end, not a single stronghold of the terrorists succumbed.
Things were much worse on the roads. Khattab himself settled east of Argun, across the Dzhalka River. By itself, this river is not so hot an obstacle, but the problem is that a decent forest belt has grown around the channel, hiding what is happening from the checkpoint closer to Argun. It was there that the rear column of internal troops was ambushed. Some cars broke through at top speed and went to the checkpoint, but several trucks were hit. The battle around the trucks was fierce, but short: having lost several people killed, the Khattabs approached the burning cars and finished off the wounded.
However, a detachment of special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who rushed to the rescue, immediately began to press on the militants. Helicopters soon arrived, and the Khattabs withdrew. The situation was similar to the south: a column heading for Argun from the south was ambushed there. Despite the losses, the disaster was avoided. With sufficient forces of the deblocking detachments, the fired "ribbons" still often managed to help out - at least to withdraw people.
But the attempts of desperate, but poorly prepared raids to save comrades ended badly. In Argun itself, at that very time, the commandant of the city, Colonel Kushnarev, died. The battle caught him on the road, and the colonel, together with a small detachment, tried to break through to the rescue. In the city, an ambush was predictably waiting for them: the colonel, along with several soldiers and officers, died. His emotional reaction is understandable, but without reconnaissance and gathering forces, everything could only end in tragedy. The Khattabs mocked the dead, literally disembowelling the bodies. At the same time, the two surviving soldiers were sheltered by local residents: despite the possible consequences for "betrayal", they hid the fighters and sent them to the commandant's office when the fighting subsided.
The fighting in Argun and around it looked strange. Khattab managed to inflict painful damage on the Russian military, but not a single object was captured, and only meager forces were distracted from the assault on Grozny. It turned out to be a bloody, spectacular and, as a result, senseless demonstration of capabilities - especially since Khattab's "cadets" themselves suffered losses. The terrorists achieved a tactical result that meant little to the entire campaign. However, quite nearby, another squad of militants received a simple knockout blow.
Shali seat
The second major target of the militants, apart from Argun, was Shali. This town is very close to the mountains, there were quite a few sympathizers of the militants inside, so from the point of view of the extremists, everything should have gone like clockwork. The attack on Shali was commanded by Aslambek Arsaev, a fairly well-known field commander, although not of the first rank. He entered Shali at the head of a detachment of four hundred militants, demanded immediate surrender from the commandant's office and arranged a rally on the square in front of the administration, where - strike while the iron is hot - they handed out weapons. It is interesting that for some reason Arsaev was sure that "the cops got scared" and expected an early capitulation.
At this time, the commandant of Shali, Alexander Bespalov, really had something to think about. The rally, which brought together the main forces of the militants and numerous sympathizers, was held just 200-300 meters from the commandant's office. It was dangerous to call "Grady" or cannon artillery on him: there was a risk of falling under "friendly fire". By a happy coincidence, Bespalov had powerful space communications equipment, so that he could maintain contact with the command continuously and not be afraid of wiretapping by militants. The solution was found quickly.
They decided to launch a Tochka-U tactical missile at the militants. This is a very powerful weapon, the only problem was that the missile needed to be perfectly aimed at the target. If the calculation had accidentally hit the wrong place, with a high degree of probability the rocket would have destroyed the commandant's office itself. However, the rocket men worked brilliantly.
Missile complex "Tochka". Photo: © RIA Novosti / Igor Zarembo
"Point" exploded right above the ongoing rally. There is still no consensus on the number of terrorists killed, but if we take the average value, then the fireball over the square was the last spectacle in life for about a hundred militants. Several hundred more people were injured. According to the soldiers under siege, even for them the explosion of the rocket left a strong feeling. After that, the siege of the commandant's office stalled. Many militants immediately decided that they did not need such a war, and went back to the mountains. Arsaev nevertheless tried to take the commandant's office, but from there howitzers were aimed at the initial positions of the militants, so that these attacks ended bloody and ingloriously for the enemy. Fortunately, the besieged had enough batteries for communication equipment for another three days.
On the second day, reinforcements with tanks and artillery entered the town, and the militants simply retreated from Shali - battered and disappointed.
Against the backdrop of the events in Argun, Shali's defense makes a rather encouraging impression. Clear and fast reaction to enemy actions, excellent communication and interaction. The terrorists suffered catastrophic losses, which canceled out all their successes on the roads near Argun, and in the end achieved nothing.
The fighting in eastern Chechnya in January 2000 did not become widely known for a prosaic reason: the plans of the militants were, in general, frustrated. They failed to delay the offensive on Grozny for a long time, and they also failed to take control of at least one city. This success came at a high cost to the military: a total of almost 80 Russian soldiers and officers died. On the whole, however, Khattab had nothing to rejoice at: the failure of his counterattack meant that a catastrophe for the militants in Grozny was becoming inevitable. The second Chechen war was rapidly coming to its climax.